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I. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen the rise of ‘internationalized’ and
hybrid courts, tribunals established by international and domestic author-
ities, typically in post-conflict situations where there is wide-scale interna-
tional involvement.  The most well-known of these tribunals are the ad
hoc tribunals charged with adjudicating claims of war crimes, crimes
against humanity and similar gross violations of human rights.1  Hybrid
* Faculty Associate in Law and Social Policy, Valparaiso University School of Law.
From 1997-1999, I served as the first Executive Officer of the Human Rights Chamber
for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That experience, at both a personal and professional
level, has influenced my questions, reflections, understandings and concerns about
international interventions and hybrid courts as a feature of such interventions.  I am
grateful to my friends and colleagues there, from Bosnia and across Europe, for
countless conversations that shaped my understanding of the war, law, human rights
and so many other things.  My thanks also to Renisa Mawani, Bonar Buffam, the
Potomac Valley Writers Workshop, especially Johanna Bond, and as always, Dave
Gage, for comments on drafts of this article.  The views I express here are solely my
own
1 See generally William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International
Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
1
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courts have been generally embraced by the international community as a
pragmatic strategy to legitimate international involvement in post-conflict
and other transitional situations and to develop local capacity; such tribu-
nals have been proposed or created in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambo-
dia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.2  It is less clear how the ‘local’
communities affected by the tribunals view them.  Although there has
been some investigation of the success of these institutions in fulfilling
their mandates, there has been limited critique of larger questions of the
appropriateness of creating such institutions and endowing them with sig-
nificant powers.  Are hybrid tribunals a manifestation of effective inter-
national, transnational or cross-cultural collaboration?  Are there risks of
real or perceived neo-imperialism in these endeavours?  What are the
opportunities and pitfalls of a hybrid structure?  What does it mean to
develop the rule of law in such a context?  With on-going international
interventions occurring around the globe, it is important to begin to seri-
ously consider these questions.
The international interventions in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor,
Cambodia and Sierra Leone in recent years have been conducted under
the auspices of United Nations and generally viewed as humanitarian
and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 279 (2008); David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra
Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 1 (2007) (evaluating hybrid tribunals in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
Cambodia); Laura A. Dickinson, Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The Promise of
Mixed Tribunals, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23 (2002) (discussing hybrid tribunals
in Kosovo and East Timor).  The Cambodian tribunal received significant recent
attention in the press. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Trial Begins for Khmer Rouge Leader,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A5 (noting that “trials are being held by a hybrid
tribunal supported by the United Nations that includes Cambodian and foreign judges
and prosecutors in an awkward legal compromise that has drawn criticism from
human rights advocates and legal scholars”).
2 See generally Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L
L. 295 (2003) (discussing the merits of hybrid tribunals); Cohen, supra note 1 R
(evaluating hybrid tribunals in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia); Dickinson,
supra note 1 (discussing hybrid tribunals in Kosovo and East Timor); Etelle R. R
Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal
Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347 (2006) (assessing advantages and
disadvantages of hybrid criminal tribunals and contrasting them to ad hoc tribunals in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda); Michael Lieberman, Salvaging The Remains: The Khmer
Rouge Tribunal on Trial, 186 MIL. L. REV. 164 (2005) (discussing proposed tribunal
for Cambodia); Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Tribunals in the 21st Century:
Iraq, Cambodia, and International Justice, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 541 (2006)
(discussing hybrid war crimes tribunals in Iraq and Cambodia); Chandra Lekha
Sriram, Wrong-sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 472 (2006) (discussing hybrid tribunal in Sierra Leone).
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endeavours.3  Yet, in some respects these interventions and the subse-
quent international involvement in nation-building bear traces of past
colonial projects.  According to conventional wisdom, the age of empire
is over, and the global community exists now in an era of post-colonialism
characterized in part by a nominal equality of nation-states and peoples.
Scholars of post-colonial theory have suggested that this view, grounded
in a wishful historicism, is incomplete, and perhaps dangerously mislead-
ing.4  As social theorist Michel Foucault reminds us, power transitions
from one form to another; it superimposes new technologies and instru-
ments upon existing forms.5  Therefore, it might be more accurate to say
that remnants of colonialism pervade social, political and economic rela-
tionships in the current period, particularly along lines of race, ethnicity
and religion and geopolitical axes of East and West, Global North and
Global South.6  These areas of imperial transformation, whereby old pat-
terns of empire take on new forms, are entangled with current geopoliti-
cal dynamics of globalization, international development and, in the
context of hybrid courts, even the human rights movement.7
3 See generally ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  (James Crawford & John S.
Bell eds., Cambridge University Press 2003) (problematizing humanitarian
interventions in East Timor, Bosnia, Rwanda and elsewhere).  The U.S.-led
intervention in Iraq is significantly more controversial, although humanitarian
motives were cited at various points.  Nonetheless, because of its differences from
UN-sponsored interventions, it is outside the scope of this article. See Wald, supra
note 2, at (discussing Iraqi Special Tribunal); see also John Dermody, Beyond Good R
Intentions: Can Hybrid Tribunals Work After Unilateral Intervention?, 30 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 77 (2006) (discussing Iraq).
4 See Generally, PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW
(Maureen Cain & Carol Smart eds., Routledge 1992); Barry Hindess, Not at Home in
the Empire, 7 SOC. IDENTITIES 363 (2001); Colin Perrin, Approaching Anxiety: The
Insistence of the Postcolonial in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in
LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 19 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick, eds.,
University of Michigan Press 1999).
5 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Society Must Be Defended, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
FOUCAULT: SELECTIONS FROM ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984, at 294-
99 (Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose eds., 1994).
6 See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 11  (noting modern humanitarian projects seem to R
“rehearse colonial fantasies about the need for benevolent tutelage of uncivilized
people who were as yet unable to govern themselves”); see also SHERENE RAZACK,
DARK THREATS AND WHITE KNIGHTS: THE SOMALIA AFFAIR, PEACEKEEPING, AND
THE NEW IMPERIALISM 9 (University of Toronto Press 2004) (“When New World
Order mythologies refer to the obligation of the First World, and the United States in
particular, to teach the Third World about democracy, the underlying logic is the same
as nineteenth-century colonialism and imperialism’s notion of a civilizing mission.”).
7 See DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL
THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 4 (Princeton University Press 2000) (noting
the ways European thought and history have influenced modern concepts such as
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Drawing insights from post-colonial theory, together with critical
globalization studies and related social theory, this article re-examines
one of the earliest and most expansive international humanitarian inter-
ventions in recent history, the intervention and on-going mission in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina.  Given the temporal and geographic scope of both
the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the subsequent international inter-
ventions, there is tremendous complexity to address even in the more
limited context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This article will therefore use
a hybrid tribunal created by the General Framework Agreement for
Peace (the Dayton Peace Agreement) as a prism to focus and refract the
larger issues at play.8  The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Her-
zegovina was a hybrid human rights tribunal created by the Dayton Peace
Agreement as one part of the broader international presence.  This article
will begin by problematizing the ‘hybrid’ structure of the Human Rights
Chamber using post-colonial elaborations of hybridity and mimesis.  It
will then examine the purported goal of establishing the rule of law, con-
sidering the substantive and procedural law developed and applied by the
Chamber, in the larger context of the international presence.  Then, it will
(re)turn to questions of identity for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is
uniquely situated in and on the border of Europe.  Throughout, it will
seek to identify strands of empire threaded throughout the international
mission and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It will also, however,
note facets of the international presence in and experience with Bosnia
and Herzegovina that diverge from imperialist traditions and constructs.
human rights); see also PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW
146 (Cambridge University Press 2001) (linking imperialism with globalization); Gil
Gott, Imperial Humanitarianism: History of an Arrested Dialectic, in MORAL
IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 19 (Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol ed.,
New York University Press 2002) (discussing connections between colonialism and
humanitarian intervention in the Victorian era and linking to present humanitarian
projects); Hindess, supra note 4 at 374 (noting ‘development’ has replaced empire as a R
“great liberal project of improvement”).
8 Other Human Rights Chamber [hereinafter Chamber] personnel have also
written about their work with the Chamber. See generally Rona Aybay, A New
Institution in the Field: The Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 529, 529 (1997) (international judge at the Chamber); Manfred
Nowak, The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina Adopts its First
Judgments, 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 174, 176 (1997) (international judge at the Chamber);
Laura Palmer & Cristina Posa, The Best-Laid Plans: Implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords in the Courtroom and on the Ground, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 361
(1999) (Posa was a summer intern with the Chamber, and Palmer with the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia [hereinafter ICTY].); J. David Yeager,
The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Case Study in
Transitional Justice, 14 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 44 (2004) (international lawyer at the
Chamber).
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It will conclude by raising important issues for further interrogation in the
on-going assessment of hybrid institutions.
II. CONSTRUCTED HYBRIDITY: OPPORTUNITIES AND INEQUITIES OF
INTERNATIONALIZATION
The notion of hybridity is, for the most part, deployed unproblemati-
cally in the context of hybrid courts and tribunals.  In this context, hybrid-
ity signifies the blended nature of such tribunals, which include national
and international components.  Typically, they comprise both foreign and
domestic judges, and they may apply domestic law, international law or a
combination of both.9  Thus, both the structure and the function of these
tribunals is purposively hybrid in nature.  For most international legal
scholars and practitioners, it has been enough to note this feature and
move on to assessing the work of the tribunals in relation to their man-
date.10  Post-colonial theory, however, suggests that something more
complex is at work in hybrid tribunals.  Hybridity implicates process as
well as structure; it is relational and dynamic.  As such, it is imbued with
the potential for relations of dominance, of contestation, and of creativ-
ity.  A more nuanced understanding of hybrid institutions depends upon
exploring those relationships.
A. Understanding Hybridity
In its most literal sense, hybridity invokes its biological and botanical
origins, describing the intermingling of two previously separate entities
(or species), forming a new and distinct creation.11  This is the sense most
international lawyers and policymakers are adopting in references to
9 Dickinson, supra note 2, at 295 (“Such courts are ‘hybrid’ because both the R
institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international
and the domestic.  Foreign judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try
cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local lawyers working with those from
other countries. The judges apply domestic law that has been reformed to accord with
international standards.”); see Higonnet, supra note 2, at 356 (noting the range of R
definitions of hybrid tribunals but the common characteristic of a mixed nature of
national and international components).
10 See, e.g., Timothy Cornell & Lance Salisbury, The Importance of Civil Law in the
Transition to Peace: Lessons from the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 389 (2002) (praising the work of the Chamber);
Sriram, supra note 2, at 472 (critiquing hybrid tribunal in Sierra Leone); cf. Higonnet, R
supra note 2, at 347 (critiquing specific hybrid tribunals but also discussing hybrid R
tribunals more generally as a model for prosecuting war crimes).
11 Despite its fairly straightforward appearance, however, this original sense of
hybridity was extended problematically first to concerns of “race science” and later
onto various cultural interactions. See ROBERT J.C. YOUNG, COLONIAL DESIRE:
HYBRIDITY IN THEORY, CULTURE AND RACE 6, 6-19 (Routledge 1995); see also
Tayyab Mahmud, Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1219, 1226-27 (1999).
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hybrid tribunals: a tribunal may be hybrid in its origins (created through
domestic and international processes), its mandate (splicing together
domestic and international law) or its composition (combining domestic
and ‘international’ members).  They are admired as a “step in [an] endless
process of creative adaptation.”12  As neither fully national, nor fully
international, they avoid the disadvantages of each, and instead they offer
the potential for increased legitimacy, domestic capacity-building, and
norm dissemination because of their unique status as both international
and domestic.13  Most commentators see their limitations as primarily a
function of inadequate funding, questions of overlap, or the vagaries of a
particular context, rather than as connected in some sense to their hybrid
nature.14
Post-colonial theorists have elaborated a more nuanced understanding
of the concept of hybridity, deploying it in multiple, and at times contra-
dictory, ways.15  Language, as opposed to biology, is a common example
and metaphor for discussing the “double-voiced” nature of hybridity.16
Hybrid or ‘creolized’ language has a “fundamental ability to be simulta-
neously the same but different”;17 other hybrids offer the same potential.
Drawing on philosopher Mikhail Bahktin’s distinction between “organic”
hybridity and “intentional” hybridity in language, post-colonial scholar
Robert Young suggests that hybridity itself may have a double nature
“that both brings together, fuses, but also maintains separation.”18
Organic hybridity reflects an unconscious and unintentional process of
amalgamation that produces something new; intentional hybridity “sets
different points of view against each other” in conflict and contestation.19
As a result, hybridity offers a “dialectical model for cultural interaction:
an organic hybridity, which will tend towards fusion, in conflict with
12 Dickinson, supra note 2, at 310. R
13 Id. at 310; see Dickinson, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing issues of legitimacy and R
capacity); see also Higonnet, supra note 2, at 347 (stressing the importance of R
including a local component for legitimacy, accessibility and capacity-building);
Frederic Megret, In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of
International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 725, 746-47 (2005) (urging
hybridity in war crimes prosecutions because it collapses artificial distinctions
between domestic and international).
14 See Dickinson, supra note 2, at 307-308; see also Higonnet, supra note 2, at 372- R
99  (discussing difficulties with particular hybrid tribunals).
15 John Hutnyk, Hybridity, 28 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 79, 80 (2005) (noting
“hybridity has come to mean all sorts of things to do with mixing and combination in
the moment of cultural exchange”).
16 YOUNG, supra note 11, at 20. R
17 Id.
18 Id. at 22.
19 Id. at 21-22.
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intentional hybridity, which enables a contestatory activity, a politicized
setting of cultural differences against each other dialogically.”20
In the context of cultural creativity in globalization, critical scholar
John Hutnyk further elaborates the myriad understandings of hybridity
and proposes that “hybridity is better conceived of as a process” or move-
ment, rather than a fixed identity.21  It is increasingly celebrated in the
new globalism, and yet, there is concern that “a flattening of differences
is secured at the very moment that celebrates difference and the creative
productivity of new mixings.”22  Hybridity may obscure histories of ine-
quality and relations of dependency and imperialism.23  Returning to the
idea of language, Hutnyk notes that translation is another common meta-
phor to describe relations across various cultural and other boundaries;
“the hybridizing moment is a communication across incommensurable
polarities.”24  The translator is in a powerful position, and that role is
often “assumed by those who can enforce their way.”25  Cultural theorist
Homi Bhabha ties hybridity most directly to the imperial and finds it at
work in the “inbetween” spaces of the relationships of colonizer and colo-
nized.26  He envisions a more transgressive hybridity, one that is ambiva-
lent and political, “an active moment of challenge and resistance against a
dominant cultural power.”27
In many senses, Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects the complexities and
contradictions of hybrid identity, amalgamation and contestation.  Ques-
tions of identity and relationship factored greatly in the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and subsequent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the inter-
national intervention that followed.28  Despite its uneven history, ‘mod-
ern’ Yugoslavia was hailed as an exemplary model of a multi-ethnic,
cosmopolitan society.29  Ethnic and corresponding religious identities,
although present and historically significant, were subsumed into a uni-
fied national consciousness and obscured by inter-marriage among
20 Id. at 22.
21 Hutnyk, supra note 15, at 81. R
22 Id.at 96.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 86.
25 Id. at 86-87.
26 HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 56 (Routledge 2004) (1994).
27 YOUNG, supra note 11, at 23. R
28 Much has been written about the fall of Yugoslavia after the death of strongman
leader Josip Broz Tito, and in particular, about the downward spiral into ethnic and
religious conflict after decades of living in a multi-ethnic society. See generally MISHA
GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA:  THE THIRD BALKAN WAR (Penguin Books
1992); ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIC, THE FRAGMENTATION OF YUGOSLAVIA:
NATIONALISM AND WAR IN THE BALKANS (2d ed. 2000); LAURA SILBER & ALLAN
LITTLE, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (Penguin Books & BBC Books 1995).
29 See generally GLENNY, supra note 28; PAVKOVIC, supra note 28; SILBER & R
LITTLE, supra note 28. R
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groups and peaceful co-existence in mixed communities.30  When the fed-
eration that was Yugoslavia began to fall in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
however, the fault lines were set along both republic border lines and
ethnic and religious boundaries.  These demarcations became entrenched
and transformed through conflict, internally within the new national bor-
ders and subsequently in relationship to the international community.31
In Bosnia, the fighting occurred along ethnic and corresponding religious
lines, and with some shifting strategic alliances, the military groups and
regions of the republic were divided accordingly; identities became fixed
in ethnic and religious terms as Bosniak Muslim, Croatian Catholic, and
Serbian Orthodox.
Upon these underlying layers of ethnic, national and religious identity
and conflict in post-war Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement imported
and constructed another set of institutions and relationships – among the
ethnic factions of Bosnia, between old and new domestic institutions, and
between the national and the international components of the on-going
international mission.32  These institutions and relationships reflect an
attempt by the international community (and, to some extent, domestic
players) to create a modern set of hybrid identities, bridging old and new
30 Yugoslavia, though a Communist state, was a darling of the West – a
sophisticated, cosmopolitan buffer state at the border between the regressive Soviet
Bloc and progressive Western Europe.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many
expected that Yugoslavia (or its constituent republics) would make the successful
transition to membership in the communities of Europe that has since been seen in
the integration of many of the Central and Eastern European nations – first through
membership in the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), and ultimately through accession to the European
Union.  OSCE, About, Participating States, Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://
www.osce.org/about/13131.html#B (“Admission to the OSCE:  30 April 1992”);
European Commission, Enlargement, Bosnia and Herzegovina – Relations with the
EU, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/
relation/index_en.htm (“Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate country for
EU accession following the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003.”).
However, the disintegration of and wars in the former Yugoslav republics have
instead become a new cautionary tale of premature declarations of independence,
ambitious self-determination and the instability produced by ethnic and religious
identity conflicts. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 128. R
31 The war in Bosnia began in 1992 and ended only in late 1995 with the peace
negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, and the resulting General Framework Agreement for
Peace. See Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly (covering the
period from 16 June 1995 to 15 June 1996), GAOR, 51st Session Supplement No. 2, at
72-76, U.N. Doc. A/51/21 (1996) (reporting Security Council Resolution 1031)
[hereinafter UN Peace Agreement Report].
32 See generally Fionnula Ni Aolain, The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace
Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 957 (1998) (discussing the
negotiation process and the ways in which the Agreement solidified existing
divisions).
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Bosnia and integrating international and domestic institutions.  The Day-
ton Peace Agreement is actually a complex series of agreements that
involve both a military component and a civilian component.33  The mili-
tary component involved a transition from the UN Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) presence to a multi-national Implementation Force
(IFOR) to oversee the military aspects of the peace;34 and the civilian
component created an Office of the High Representative (OHR), an ad
hoc international institution, to oversee the civilian aspects of the peace.35
The civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement included significant atten-
tion to human rights and the rule of law.36
The IFOR and the OHR were created as international institutions led
by non-Bosnians or ‘internationals’ and staffed primarily by the same.  As
manifestations of external power exercised within the supposedly sover-
eign territory of Bosnia, they most obviously raise the spectre of imperial-
ism.37  In contrast, other institutions created by the Dayton Peace
Agreement were created as deliberately hybrid national-international
bodies, obscuring relations of power and offering at least the potential for
a dialectical creativity.  These institutions were not, of course, ‘organic’
hybrids, but it is less clear whether they attained some form of intentional
or transgressive hybridity over time.  In some respects, the constructed
hybridities of the Dayton Peace Agreement reinscribed ethnic identities
and reaffirmed the boundaries (and hierarchy) between international and
national individuals and institutions.  In other respects, these institutions
engaged in the dialogue and contestation of hybridity along various lines
of division.  The Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
33 The full text of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, the Annexes to
the Dayton Peace Agreement, and related documents are available from numerous
sources, including the Office of the High Representative. The website of the Office of
the High Representative is located at http://www.ohr.int/. See also UN Peace
Agreement Report, supra note 31, at 72-76 (reporting adoption of Security Council R
Resolution 1031); Dayton Peace Agreement, 7 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH SUPP.
1 (1996), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html
[hereinafter Dayton Peace Agreement].
34 UN Peace Agreement Report, supra note 31, at 72-76.  The military component R
of the Agreement is outside the scope of this article.
35 Id. at 79 (reporting adoption of Security Council Resolution 1035).
36 Annex 4 to the Agreement, setting forth the new Bosnian Constitution and
providing for a new Constitutional Court, and Annex 6, creating a Human Rights
Commission, work together to establish this new framework of institutions and law.
Dayton Peace Accords, supra note 33, at 25, 34.  The Human Rights Commission R
comprised a Human Rights Ombudsperson, and the Human Rights Chamber, a
tribunal to hear cases involving human rights violations. Id. at 34.
37 See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 26 (arguing that “the nature of post-conflict R
reconstruction in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor mirrors the way
in which the international community supported colonialism in earlier periods”).
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hybrid court created by the Peace Agreement, embodies and illustrates
the contours of that deliberate hybridity in Bosnia.
B. The Mechanics of a Hybrid Court
The Human Rights Chamber was created under Annex 6 of the Dayton
Peace Agreement to “assist the Parties in honouring their obligations” to
secure the highest level of international human rights protection for the
people of Bosnia.38  More broadly, it was conceived as an intentionally
hybrid court with the teleology of achieving Europeanized protection of
human rights and the rule of law in the specific context of post-war Bos-
nia.  Most of the hybrid courts that have been created in the context of
humanitarian intervention have focused on matters of international crim-
inal law.39  In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a hybrid tribunal, the Human
Rights Chamber, was created to address more quotidian violations of
human rights in the context of the post-war period; the parties before it
were individual victims of human rights making claims against govern-
mental entities in Bosnia.40  In that sense, the Chamber presents a partic-
ularly interesting case for analysis; the international-national hybrid court
issued judgement against domestic governmental entities rather than
individuals.
As a creation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Human Rights
Chamber was grafted onto an existing legal framework that had been
devastated by years of war and that was itself being transformed by the
peace process.  The initial impetus for the Chamber was to fill a tempo-
rary need created by the devastation of local judicial institutions in the
war and to address cases involving human rights violations that local
courts were unable to address.41  As a sui generis hybrid institution, the
Human Rights Chamber was designed to frame domestic interests for
resolution in accord with international interests and put domestic pres-
ence in dialogue with international presence. The OHR and other inter-
national players provided overarching support – financial and otherwise –
38 Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 33, annex 6. R
39 They have adjudicated cases involving individuals charged with war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and other gross violations of human rights. See generally
Higonnet, supra note 2 (assessing advantages and disadvantages of hybrid criminal R
tribunals).
40 An international criminal court, such as the ICTY, adjudicates cases brought by
international prosecutors against individual defendants, whereas the Chamber
adjudicated civil matters and heard claims against the State of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.
See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 391 (suggesting it is equally, if not more, R
important to consider civil justice mechanisms).
41 See Aolain, supra note 32, at 985-88 (discussing the Human Rights R
Commission’s role, including the Chamber’s role, as an ‘international’ guarantor of
human rights but also the potential pitfalls in such an approach).
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to the work of the Human Rights Chamber, including assistance with
implementation and enforcement of decisions.42  The domestic players –
the national and local governments – primarily appeared before the
Human Rights Chamber as a party in proceedings.43  The national courts,
particularly the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the country,
became engaged in a sort of competition with the Chamber for prestige,
resources and final authority on questions of law for the duration of the
international mission.44
In structure, the Chamber both institutionalized existing ethnic divides
and conflated them into a representation of ‘Bosnian’ (or ‘local’) in juxta-
position to ‘international.’45  Of the fourteen judges on the court, a
majority of eight were European, nominated and appointed by the Com-
42 HUM. RTS. CHAMBER FOR BOSN. & HERZ., Annual Report 8-9, 11-12 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Chamber Report]; HUM. RTS. CHAMBER FOR BOSN. & HERZ.,
Annual Report 4, 12-13 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Chamber Report].
43 1999 Chamber Report, supra note 42, at 10-11; 1998 Chamber Report, supra R
note 42, at 5-6. R
44 The subordination of these national institutions to the international presence
was evident from their inception.  First, Article II of the Bosnian Constitution, which
is itself an Annex to the Dayton Peace Agreement, provides for the new
Constitutional Court, the highest level national court.  Dayton Peace Agreement,
supra note 33, at 26.  Although the Constitutional Court has appellate jurisdiction R
over any other court decision in the country, including decisions concerning human
rights matters, it did not have jurisdiction to hear appeals of Human Rights Chamber
decisions. Id.  Article II, section one of the Constitution makes clear that while the
state “shall ensure the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms,” the Human Rights Commission is created to that end. Id.
(“To that end, there shall be a Human Rights Commission for Bosnia and
Herzegovina . . . .”).  Article II, section two also makes various international human
rights treaties directly applicable in domestic law. Id. (“The rights and freedoms set
forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.”).
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court is also an intentional hybrid of national and
international judges.  As opposed to the Human Rights Chamber, under Article VI of
the new Constitution the national judges in the Constitutional Court are in the
majority, with six of nine members selected by various national authorities. Id. at 30
(“The Constitutional Court . . . shall have nine members . . . .  Four members shall be
selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, and two members by the
Assembly of the Republika Srpska.”).  The remaining three members are selected by
the President of the European Court of Human Rights, none of whom may be citizens
of Bosnia or its neighbouring states. Id. at 30 (“The remaining three members shall be
selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation
with the Presidency.”).  Additional information on the Bosnian Constitutional Court
is available at the English-language version of its website at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/.
45 See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 48 (noting in legal texts “the self of the R
‘international community’ is created by defining that community against its others”).
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mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.46  The remaining six judges
were Bosnian, with two members from each ethnic group – Serb, Croat
and Bosniak – appointed by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(the predominantly Bosniak and Croat entity of the Bosnian state) and
the Republika Srpska (the predominantly Serb entity of the Bosnian
state).47  The President of the Chamber, the presiding judge, was selected
from among the European judges.48  Despite the deliberate attempts to
institutionalize hybridity in the structure of the Human Rights Chamber
(and in the broader international mission) as a form of transition from
international control to domestic control, there was little of the fusion or
amalgamation imagined in the “organic” hybridity identified by Young
and Bahktin.49  Nor was there the dynamic contestation suggested by
Hutnyk and Bhabha.  Instead, individual identities became fixed within
the Chamber, and the veneer of hybridity rested upon and reinforced
existing divisions of Bosniak-Croat-Serb and binaries of national-
international.50
The constructed hybridity, particularly along the binary line of interna-
tional-national, was predictably an unequal hybridity.51  It was a “tran-
quillising” and “banal” hybridity that occluded material inequities and
resisted the possibility of a “theory of relational cultures.”52  Within the
Chamber, the differences between international judges and staff and
national judges and staff were numerous.  International judges resided
elsewhere and flew into Bosnia once a month for a week-long session,
46 1998 Chamber Report, supra note 42, at 1 (“The Human Rights Chamber has R
fourteen members . . . eight [nominated] by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe.”).
47 Id. (“four members were appointed by the Federation of BiH, two by the
Republika Srpska”).
48 Id. (“The President of the Chamber has been designated by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe from among the international members.”).  Annex
B to the Annual Report includes a list and biographies for the Members of the
Chamber.
49 YOUNG, supra note 11, at 21. R
50 The need to establish and police identity boundaries is a common feature of
imperial endeavours. See generally Perrin, supra note 4, at 19 (discussing the R
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a neo-colonial encounter);
Mahmud, supra note 11, at 1219 (discussing the deployment of shifting racial R
stereotypes to support colonial distinctions that are still present in “modern notions of
citizenship, sovereignty, representation, and the rule of law”).
51 See Higonnet, supra note 2, at 369 (noting the need for attention to power R
inequalities within hybrid tribunals); see also UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND
EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 20
(University of Chicago Press 1999) (noting “the language of those comparisons is not
neutral and cannot avoid notions of superiority and inferiority, backward and
progressive, and higher and lower”).
52 Hutnyk, supra note 15, at 97-98. R
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whereas national judges lived and worked in Bosnia.53  The idea that
international judges and staff might use (or learn) the national lan-
guage(s) was never suggested; English was the primary language of daily
interaction – the “retaining wall” between groups – although in the for-
mal procedures and publications of the Chamber simultaneous interpre-
tation or multiple language versions were employed.54  Similar
distinctions were also reflected in the staff of the court.55
These distinctions are not uncommon in international or transnational
work, but they are difficult to ignore in a hybrid institution, particularly in
an institution designed to protect human rights and prohibit discrimina-
tion.  The rationales that support them often rely on the idea of the differ-
ences in doing such work at “home” versus in the “field.”56  Indeed, as
critical geographer Allison Mountz suggests, where you are often defines
who you are, as much as who you are defines where you are.57  Globaliza-
53 See 1999 Chamber Report, supra note 42, at 3. R
54 FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS 38 (Charles L. Markmann, trans.,
Grove Press 1967) (stating that “there is a retaining-wall relation between language
and group. To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture.”); see Higonnet, supra
note 2, at 365 (suggesting changes in practices regarding language and translation in R
hybrid tribunals).
55 See 1998 Chamber Report, supra note 42, Annex C.  Annex C to the Report R
contains a list of Chamber staff. Id.  The Executive Officer and Registrar, the most
senior staff members, were both ‘international’ positions. Id.  The remaining staff
members, primarily administrative staff and interpreters, were Bosnian. Id. Over
time, several lawyers were added to the staff, and they included both international
and national lawyers. Id.
56 Human rights workers, like anthropologists and other ethnographers, must
grapple with the idea of doing work in the “field.”  The idea of the field has been
more effectively investigated by social theorists than by lawyers or human rights
advocates thus far. See Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Discipline and Practice: “The
Field” as Site, Method, and Location in Anthropology, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL
LOCATIONS: BOUNDARIES AND GROUNDS OF A FIELD SCIENCE 32 (Akhil Gupta et al.
eds., University of California Press 1996).  Gupta and Ferguson, among others, have
interrogated its significance as “the spatialization of difference” in anthropology. Id.
Hyndman expands upon its significance in various forms of transnational work:
Just as there is tension between discourses of universality and particularity – the
shared language and entitlements of human rights versus distinguishing  cultural
practices – a discursive distance between “here” and “there,” “us”  and “them,”
confounds any singular understanding of culture.  “The field” is a diffuse and
problematic term for geographers, anthropologists, and other researchers who
travel in a privileged way across cultures.  For some, “the  field” is a place
impossibly outside the power relations that organize “home.”  Without home,
there can be no field.
JENNIFER HYNDMAN 16,  MANAGING DISPLACEMENT: REFUGEES AND THE POLITICS
OF HUMANITARIANISM 88-89 (Minnesota University Press 2000).
57 Allison Mountz, Embodying the Nation-State: Canada’s Response to Human
Smuggling, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 323, 336 (2004) (“The shaping of migrant identities
connected powerfully to their access to due process across time and space, the
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tion scholars have problematized these distinctions as new forms of
“global citizenship” that have risen with the increase in transnational
projects.  On one side of the spectrum, there are the “flexible citizens” or
“supra-citizens” of the Global North.58  Aiwa Ong’s flexible citizens are
primarily those with significant social and economic capital who can
“respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic
conditions” and move freely across borders and within global flows.59
More common in transnational work are Jennifer Hyndman’s “supra-citi-
zens,” the “cadre of international professional[s]” working on humanita-
rian projects.60  At the other end of the spectrum are the “sub-citizens”
Hyndman juxtaposes to “supra-citizens;” these are the refugees, the inter-
nally displaced and others for whom the supra-citizens ostensibly work.61
These distinctions are less about the nature of citizenship (although this
may certainly be relevant) and more about hierarchy and status.62
In the context of the Chamber, there may not have been “sub-citizens,”
but the structures of membership ensured that there were “supra-citi-
zens.”  These institutional differences shaped the contours of hybridity
within the court.  In a sense, the hybrid structure of the Chamber suc-
ceeded; the Chamber decided thousands of cases over its years of opera-
tion, many unanimously.  International and national judges and staff
worked successfully together for many years, and the various Bosnian
governmental bodies increasingly participated in the Chamber’s
processes.63  Nonetheless, it was not a fully intentional and creative
hybridity at work.  Distinctions in status permeated the work and rela-
tionships of the institution, as well as the work and relationships of the
larger international presence.  Moreover, the ambivalent and unequal
hybridity of the Chamber’s structure was also made visible in the prac-
tices and decisions of the court.
narrative of who they were explained where they were, and vice versa.”) (emphasis in
original).
58 See generally Aiwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of
Transnationalism (1999) (discussing flexible citizenship); HYNDMAN, supra note 56, at
110-11 (discussing supra-citizens and sub-citizens).
59 Ong, supra note 58, at 6. R
60 HYNDMAN, supra note 56, at 111. R
61 Id.
62 Id.; see also ORFORD , supra note 3, at 198-99 (discussing income differentials R
between local and international staff in Rwanda and distinctions between
‘international’ and ‘local’ staff in providing evacuation or protection).
63 In my experience, the interpersonal relationships within the court were cordial
and professional.  I do not mean to suggest that any individual or individuals within
the Chamber acted in a discriminatory manner or otherwise intentionally
manipulated power relations.  My point is a more general one about the nature of
institutional hierarchies in a hybrid institution in the current geo-political context. See
Dickinson, supra note 2, at 306 (noting “such hybrid relationships can raise new R
questions about who is really controlling the process”).
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III. THE RULE OF LAW: HYBRIDITY AND MIMESIS IN PRACTICE
The ambivalent hybridity that is manifest in the institutional structures
superimposed by the Dayton Peace Agreement becomes clearer and
takes on new dimensions in their work to (re)establish the rule of law in
Bosnia.  The Bosnian Constitution, set forth in Annex 4 to the Dayton
Peace Agreement, affirms in Article I that Bosnia “shall be a democratic
state, which shall operate under the rule of law.”64  One aspect of the
international mission in Bosnia was to re-establish this “rule of law” – to
translate the purportedly universal law of Europe to the particular con-
text of Bosnia – and the human rights institutions created by Annex 6
were intended to play a significant role in this process.65  Together the
Constitution in Annex 4 and the Chamber’s mandate set out in Annex 6
constitute a sweeping importation of a new legal framework as formative
of the new nation.66  This legal framework displaces existing domestic law
and replaces it with a European and international human rights legal
regime.67  In the case of the Human Rights Chamber (Chamber), the pro-
cedures and substantive law of the European human rights system were
“received” wholesale.  The scope of the rights adjudicated by the Cham-
ber were framed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) and
the interpretation of that European Convention by the European Court
64 Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 33, annex 4, art. I; see also David Theo R
Goldberg, THE RACIAL STATE 154 (Blackwell Publishers 2001) (articulating the
significance of law as “a generalized and generalizing apparatus of power deeply
implicated in establishing state sovereignty, consolidating and reifying lines of power
in modern state formation”); FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 111 (discussing the ways R
in which law is formative of the nation).
65 See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 391 (suggesting “[b]y helping instill a R
sense of the rule of law, the Chamber has become a key instrument in the transition to
a more peaceful nation”); see also Yeager, supra note 8, at 44 (discussing the R
Chamber’s role in establishing the rule of law).  Peter Fitzpatrick suggests that
“[a]dherence to ‘human’ rights is by now the pervasive criteria by which a nation’s
proximity to the horizon of the universal may be gauged.” FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, R
at 126.
66 Peter Fitzpatrick notes that “stories of the progression of society are intimately
tied to and even told in terms of the progression of law.” FITZPATRICK, supra note 4. R
Fitzpatrick also suggests that in the imperial context, “law was pre-eminent amongst
the ‘gifts’ of an expansive civilization, one which could extend in its abounding
generosity to the entire globe.” FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 178; see generally R
ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (expanded ed., Howard
Greenfeld trans., Beacon Press 1991) (discussing colonial relationships).
67 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 4, at 107-11 (discussing the role of law in
colonialism); see also H. RAZACK, supra note 6, at 9-10 (noting a shared feature of R
both nineteenth century and contemporary projects of empire is “a deeply held belief
in the need to and the right to dominate others for their own good, others who are
expected to be grateful”) (emphasis in original).
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of Human Rights (European Court), the Strasbourg-based tribunal
charged with hearing cases arising under the European Convention.68
The practices and procedures of the Chamber were modeled on those of
the European Court.69
In its work, then, the unequal hybridity of the Chamber shifted its bal-
ance further toward international or European dominance.  International
human rights law, and particularly European human rights law, displaced
domestic law by (international) design.  Even the procedures of the court
were transformed as international practice was translated to the Bosnian
context.  All this occurred under the umbrella of a negotiated peace
agreement after years of war, and yet seldom, if ever, was the violence
supporting the initial incorporation of European/international human
rights law and the circumvention of typical sovereign acceptance of these
obligations critically examined.70  Regardless of these circumstances, the
international hegemony embedded in both the substance and procedures
used raises important questions about the validity of the rule and role of
this received law of Europe.71
A. Importing Universal Law
International law generally operates as a consent-based regime, and
sovereign nation states become bound to international obligations by
68 Dayton Peace Agreement supra note 33, annex 6, art. I; see Protocol No. 11 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4
November 1950, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established thereby (with
Appendix)RESTRUCTURING THE CONTROL MACHINERY ESTABLISHED THEREBY,
MAY 11, 1994, 2061 U.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter Protocol No. 11], available at http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=155&CM=7&DF=10/
08/2009&CL=ENG.
69 1998 Chamber Report, supra note 42; 1999 Chamber Report, supra note 42 R
(noting “substantial adjustments have been made to provide for the special
composition and circumstances of the Chamber”); see Cornell & Salisbury, supra note
10, at 397. R
70 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 178  (discussing the connection between law R
and force in empire, where “the violence of imperialism was legitimated in its being
exercised through law”); FITZPATRICK, supra, note 4, at 108 (noting the paradox of
imperialism in “the claim of a civilizing law to bring order through the constant
infliction of violence”).
71 See NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM
AND THE RULE OF LAW 2, 22-32 (Martha Minow et al. eds., University of Michigan
Press 2003) (discussing “the extension of English law and constitutionality to the
colonies: the haphazard introduction of a rule of law, its colonial mutations, and its
enduring consequences”); see also ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY  25-35
(University of California Press 2001) (discussing the one-sided nature of law under
colonialism);  Gott, supra note 7, at 25, 30 (noting the importance of the “formation of R
an international law of empire” in support of early colonialism and its connection to
transnational humanitarianism).
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becoming party to a treaty or through the gradual emergence of custom-
ary international norms.72  Although these means are sufficient to bind a
state at the international level, nations generally also have their own
internal processes that make international obligations effective at the
domestic level, or as a matter of domestic law.  Sometimes this occurs
through a domestic ratification process or through the passage of imple-
menting legislation, or it may even occur through the reorganization of
mechanisms of the state.  These are the common features – and often the
challenges – of synthesizing parallel and intersecting international and
domestic legal regimes.  Sovereignty, as understood in international law,
comprises the authority both to undertake international obligations and
to determine how best to implement them at the domestic level.73
That process – and the sovereignty it represents – was significantly sub-
verted in post-war Bosnia.  Eliding the complicated processes of imple-
mentation and internalization, the Dayton Peace Agreement purports to
make various European and international human rights instruments, met-
onymic representations of “Europe” and the “rule of law,” directly appli-
cable as Bosnian law.  In one sense, there was consent by the newly
sovereign Bosnia through its involvement in the peace negotiations; yet it
was a consent constrained by the context of negotiating an end to hostili-
ties – not just among the warring parties, but under threat of continued
bombardment by NATO forces.  As a result, Bosnia became bound by
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights without
becoming party to the treaty; in fact, at that time, Bosnia was not eligible
to become a party to the European Convention, which is limited to mem-
bers of the Council of Europe.74  Bosnia was bound to observe European
and international human rights law internally as a matter of its domestic
72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987) (identifying sources of international law).  The common
language of undertaking in human rights treaties requires a state party to respect and
ensure the rights of “all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, § 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; cf. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art
2 § 1 Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.53.
73 See Abraham D. Sofaer et al. &, Sovereignty, The Practitioners’ Perspective, in
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY:  CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 24,
31-33 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., Columbia University Press 2001) (describing these
international commitments as the exercise of sovereignty, rather than limitations
upon sovereignty); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2645-46 (1997) (discussing the theory that internalized
compliance and obedience increase comportment with international law).
74 Bosnia and Herzegovina became a member of the Council of Europe and party
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in 2002.  Council of Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council of
Europe, available at  http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states/
e_bo.asp  (noting Bosnia joined the Council of Europe on Apr. 24, 2002); Convention
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law at the same time it was prohibited from full membership and partici-
pation externally as a sovereign nation of Europe.  To police those
boundaries of internal compliance and external exclusion, the Dayton
Peace Agreement created a new tribunal, the Human Right Chamber.
Under the new Bosnian Constitution, the European Convention on
Human Rights is directly incorporated into the domestic law of Bosnia in
Article II(2): “The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These
shall have priority over all other law.”75  Later paragraphs of Article II
enumerate specific rights that are protected, and clarify that “all courts,
agencies, governmental organs, and instrumentalities . . .  shall apply and
conform to” those rights.76  Article II also affirms that Bosnia shall be
party to a range of international human rights agreements listed in an
annex, further expanding the scope of international obligations domesti-
cally.77  Annex 6, which creates the Human Rights Chamber, reinforces
this direct incorporation in Article I where the parties agree to secure to
all persons within their jurisdiction the rights enumerated in the Euro-
pean Convention and in other international human rights agreements
listed in an appendix (which essentially parallel the list appended to the
constitution).78  Looking at the text of Annex 6, there seems to be noth-
ing particularly noteworthy or problematic about this; the language is
straightforward.  Accounts of the peace negotiations rarely note it, and it
does not appear to have been a point of serious contestation.  This direct
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:  Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Nov. 4, 1950, 2246 U.N.T.S. 124.
75 UN Peace Agreement Report supra note 31 annex 4, art. II. R
76 Id. at 119.
77 Id. at 120.  These agreements are: the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Geneva Conventions I-IV on the
Protection of the Victims of War, and the 1977 Geneva Protocols I-II; the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1966 Protocol; the Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women; the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 1966
and 1989 Optional Protocols; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the European Convention on the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the
Rights of the Child; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages; and the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities.
78 Id. at 130-31; UN Peace Agreement Report, supra note 31. R
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incorporation of international law into domestic law is remarkable and
raises an unmistakable spectre of empire.
Perhaps this wholesale importation of international human rights law
seems unproblematic given the ‘universal’ nature of human rights.79
Most international human rights advocates – and many of the human
rights instruments themselves – explicitly assert the universality of human
rights standards.80  This claim of universality of rights remains controver-
sial within the human rights field.81  Critiques of universalism(s) have
become common-place within human rights discourse and across a range
of fields, and they have much to offer.  They have challenged the idea of
the international/global as “more abstract, less institutionalized” and as
“universal and impersonal”;82 in the context of human rights, this pur-
ported universality is instead increasingly identified as a hegemonic,
79 See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10 (analyzing this power of the international R
community as a positive force in support of the rule of law). But see FITZPATRICK,
supra note 4, at 117-18 (noting how the ‘rule of law’ has become a new “universal
measure of appropriate behaviour” and as a marker of civilization in contrast to
barbarism); FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 180 (pointing out that “the colonist claimed R
to bring law from the outside, a civilized law of universal valency free from polluting
involvement with the particularity of the local scene”).
80 This is evident from the foundational documents of the modern human rights
movement, such as the documents of the International Bill of Rights – the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights, and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doc. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 72; International Covenant on Economic, Social R
and Cultural Rights, supra note 72.  More recently, the UN General Assembly stated R
in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: “The World Conference on
Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all States to fulfill their
obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, all
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and international law.
The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.” World
Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, ¶ I.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF157/23 (July. 12, 1993).
81 It is frequently resisted in the name of “culture” and cultural relativism –
sometimes by governments that seek to avoid international human rights obligations,
but increasingly by a wide spectrum of activists, policymakers, and scholars.  In some
senses, the claim for cultural relativism is an attempt to resist the universalizing global
and reassert local perspective. See Gott, supra note 7, at 34 (“Contemporary human R
rights discontents share a healthy scepticism toward a postwar legal cosmopolitanism
that codifies, and aspires to extend geographically, a Western conception of rights.
Critics of the existing orthodoxy offer instead a variety of approaches that would
privilege subaltern values in a regenerated human rights agenda.”).
82 M. Kearney, The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and
Transnationalism, 24 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY. 547, 548-49 (1995).
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Western view of human rights.83  At times, the debate between universal-
ism and cultural relativism in human rights has been polarizing and
immobilizing.  Nonetheless, universal claims retain their appeal and have
undoubtedly improved the lives of many people in particular times and
places.84
Globalization scholar Anna Tsing offers an alternative view of ‘univer-
sal’ claims that destabilizes the traditional opposition and more fully
explicates the opportunities and limitations that may arise with such
claims.85  She does not shy away from the complicated history of univer-
salisms, which are deeply implicated in colonial histories as well as in
more recent colonial endeavours.86  Tsing re-imagines universal claims
“not as truths or lies but as sticky engagements.”87  She argues for
engagement as a means to counter the disciplinary ambitions of
universalism:
Engaged universals travel across difference and are charged and
changed by their travels.  Through friction, universals become practi-
cally effective.  Yet they can never fulfill their promises of universal-
ity.  Even in transcending localities, they don’t take over the world.
They are limited by the practical necessity of mobilizing adherents.
Engaged universals must convince us to pay attention to them. All
universals are engaged when considered as practical projects accom-
plished in a heterogeneous world.88
83 See Gott, supra note 7, at 34 (noting “human rights discourse and practice face R
intense scrutiny as potentially hegemonic legitimators of neoimperial relations”); see
also Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International
Law, 5 SOC.  & LEGAL STUD. 321, 332-33 (1996) (discussing the ways European
norms are presented as universal in colonial contexts); Abdullahi A. An-Na’im,
Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, 331, 348-53 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im
& Francis M. Deng eds., The Brookings Institution 1990) (discussing the exclusion of
non-western participants and perspectives in the early development of the
international human rights regime); HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN,
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 36–37 (Juris
Publishing 2000) (identifying a “Southern” critique of the “Western origins,
orientation and cultural bias” of the international legal order).
84 The successes of the human rights movement in advancing legal protections for
individuals at the international level of treaty development and at the grassroots level
of public education and local law reform provide numerous examples.
85 See generally ANNA LOWENHAUPT TSING, FRICTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
GLOBAL CONNECTION (Princeton University Press 2005).
86 Id. at 9; see  CHAKRABARTY, supra note 7, at 5 (suggesting “[p]ostcolonial R
scholarship is committed, almost by definition, to engaging the universals . . . that
were forged in eighteenth-century Europe” and that underlie the Enlightenment).
87 TSING, supra note 85, at 6 (2005). R
88 Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
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Some would suggest that human rights work at its best – where univer-
sal rights claims are given traction at the local level by collaborative,
grassroots involvement – may reflect this sort of engaged universalism.
Hybrid courts, with their blend of the national (if not local) and the inter-
national, aspire to just this sort of engagement.
The work of the Human Rights Chamber shows signs of both produc-
tive ‘sticky’ engagement as well as the imperial tendencies of universal-
ism.  Following the mandates of the new Constitution and of Annex 6, the
substantive law applied by the Human Rights Chamber was predomi-
nantly the European Convention and the case law developed by the
European Court to interpret it.  European Court doctrines – such as the
‘margin of appreciation,’ which gives latitude to nations in determining
the most appropriate means of implementing their rights obligations89 –
provided some room for domestic development of the law; however, local
law was ultimately evaluated for its compliance with European and inter-
national human rights standards.90  For example, in one of the earliest
cases decided on the merits, Damjanovic v. the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,91 the Human Rights Chamber unanimously overturned a
death sentence pronounced during the war.  Relying exclusively on the
European Convention and the case law of the European Court, the
Chamber overturned the provisions of domestic law supporting the
sentence.92
89 The doctrine of “margin of appreciation” has been explained as follows:
Although the Commission and Court [now Court] invoke the principle of strict
interpretation and thus the favourable balancing of individual rights against state
interests, they in fact leave a certain amount of discretion for the states to decide
whether a given course of action is compatible with Convention requirements.
This state discretion is referred to as the ‘margin of appreciation.’
DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER  215 (Council of Europe
Publishing 1996).  The doctrine reflects the view that “state authorities are in principle
in a better position than the international judge” to assess the balance of rights in
particular domestic contexts. Id; see also Paul Mahoney, Marvelous Richness of Diver-
sity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19 HUM. RTS. L. J. 1 (1998) (discussing the
principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation); George Letsas, Two Con-
cepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 206 (2006) (discussing
history and uses of the doctrine of margin of appreciation); see, e.g., Medan v. Bosn.
& Herz. , CH/96/3, 8 & 9 ¶ 36 (Human Rights Chamber 1997), available at http://
www.hrc.ba/database/decisions/CH96-3&8&9%20Medan%20et%20al%20Merits%20
E.pdf.
90 The decisions of the Human Rights Chamber are available in a searchable
database at the Chamber website at http://www.hrc.ba/.
91 Damjanovic v.  Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/30 (Human Rights Chamber 1997),
available at http://www.hrc.ba/database/decisions/CH96-30%20Damjanovic%20
Merits%20E.pdf.
92 Id. at ¶¶ 26-44, 49.
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This pattern of decision-making was repeated in many subsequent
cases: the heavily ‘international’ Chamber found various domestic laws,
particularly those enacted during the war or its immediate aftermath, in
violation of the European standards reflected in the European Conven-
tion, now supreme Bosnian law by declaration of the Peace Agreement.93
In a particularly telling analysis in the case of Kevesevic v. the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina,94 the Chamber found that a domestic law on
apartments ‘abandoned’ during the war did not meet the new (European)
criteria of ‘law’:
The Chamber must decide whether the legal instruments in ques-
tion can be regarded as “law” for the purposes of Article 8 para-
graph 2 of the [European] Convention . . . .
The term “law” is related to certain qualitative criteria of a norm,
requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly
mentioned in the preamble of the [European] Convention. . . .  It
includes the following elements . . . .
Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible . . . . Secondly, a
norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with suf-
ficient precision to allow the citizen to regulate his conduct . . . .
Finally, it appears from the case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights that the law must provide safeguards against abuse
. . . .
. . . .
. . . This Law does therefore not meet the requirements of the
“rule of law” in a democratic society. . . .95
In this excerpt, the Chamber appears to deftly deploy the neutral, uni-
versal language of rights and the rule of law to reach a decision.96  Uni-
versal/European conceptions of rights were directly imported into the
domestic legal landscape, supplanting whatever conception of rights
existed in Bosnia or would have developed through the Bosnian legal
system.97
93 See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 78-79 (discussing the “forms of power exercised by R
international lawyers” in their role as experts in humanitarian interventions).
94 Kevesevic v. Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/46 (Human Rights Chamber 1998),
available at http://www.hrc.ba/database/decisions/CH97-46%20Kevesevic%20Merits
%20E.pdf.
95 Id. at ¶¶ 51-53, 57 (citations to multiple decisions of the European Court and to
the Chamber’s Damjanovic decision omitted).
96 Interestingly, the only dissents to this decision were by two ‘international’
judges, who thought the decision did not go far enough. See id. at pp. 15-16 .
97 There is a striking parallel to colonial practice. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 4, at
110 (“The European encompassed the very being of the colonized.  Because of their
higher position in the scale of progression, the colonists could know and represent the
natives better than they could themselves.  The most complex of resident legal
cultures were taken over with an unquestioning confidence by colonial administrators
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Although many of the issues considered by the Human Rights Cham-
ber over the course of more than a decade of work reflected distinctly
and specifically Bosnian concerns – for example, discrimination on the
basis of ethnic group, loss of property rights in the massive displacements
of the war, and lingering consequences of emergency rules enacted during
the war – these were filtered through and assessed under the universal-
izing gaze of Europe.98  At times, sticky engagement or dynamic hybridity
appeared in the occasional dissenting opinions of the national judges.99
Resistance also appeared in the initial reluctance of governmental bodies
to participate in the Chamber processes; it was eventually channelled into
the anticipation of the eventual demise of the Human Rights Chamber at
the end of its transitional tenure.100  Often, the possibilities of a dialecti-
cal hybridity were constrained by the structural dominance of the ‘inter-
national’ in the court, in its law and in its procedures, and in the broader
international mission.
B. Mimicry as Method
The rule of law exists not only in the substance of the received law, but
also profoundly in the procedures established to address that sub-
stance.101  While an intentional and dynamic hybridity may have been the
aspiration for the work of the Chamber, the practice suggests instead the
whence they were incidentally but radically transformed.  Even when legal regulation
remained in local hands  . . . they were subject to scrutiny and rejection under so-
called repugnancy clauses in colonial legislation. With these clauses, local law or
custom could not be effective if found to be ‘repugnant to natural justice’ or to ‘the
general principles of humanity’ and such – criteria intrinsic, of course, to a universal
imperial project.”)
98 See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 403-08 (discussing Chamber’s cases). R
99 See, e.g., Matanovic v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/1 at pp. 17-18 (Human Rights
Chamber 1997), available at http://www.hrc.ba/database/decisions/CH96-1%20
Matanovic%20Merits%20E.pdf; Grgic v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/15 at pp. 6-8
(1997), available at http://www.hrc.ba/database/decisions/CH96-15%20Grgic%20
Merits%20E.pdf; Mitrovic v. Bosn. & Herz., CH/98/948 at pp. 12-13 (Human Rights
Chamber 2002), available at http://www.hrc.ba/database/decisions/CH98-948%20
MITROVIC%20Merits%20E.pdf.
100 Note the Chamber was always envisioned as temporary as a creature of the
Dayton Peace Agreement.  Ultimately, it was decided that it would be merged into
the Constitutional Court. See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 405-06 R
(discussing early resistance to the Chamber by domestic authorities).
101 See Yeager, supra note 8, at 45-47 (discussing the procedures of the Chamber); R
see generally Marie-Benedicte Dembour et al., Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses
at War Crimes Trials, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151 (2004) (discussing impact of tribunal
processes on victim-witness accounts before the ICTY); Samera Esmeir, 1948: Law,
History, Memory, 21 SOC. TEXT 75  (2003) (discussing how legal rules of evidence
structure, produce and exclude memories and historical accounts).
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“ironic compromise” of mimicry.102  Post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha
has traced the emergence of mimicry in the colonial context as a strategy
of “colonial power and knowledge.”103  In that context, imperial power is
ambivalent, seeking both to remake the colonized but also to maintain its
difference.  There is a “desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a
subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite.”104  Mimicry
is “stricken by an indeterminacy” that ultimately undermines imperial
authority because the process of ‘reform’ never quite succeeds.105  In its
indeterminacy, the imitation slides between the mimetic difference that is
“almost nothing but not quite” and the menacing difference that is
“almost total but not quite.”106  The metaphor of language and transla-
tion is also useful here.107  The mimics may serve as “a class of interpret-
ers” between the governors and the governed.108  The ability to translate
culture, language, and process – either literally or figuratively – offers a
conditional power, a form of “honorary citizenship” for those subject to
imperial authority.109
In its practice, the Human Rights Chamber consciously imitated the
European Court of Human Rights.  The structure of the Annex 6 Human
Rights Commission – an Ombudsperson and the Chamber – was modeled
directly on the structure of the European Court and Commission as it
existed at the time.110  No similar institutions had existed as part of the
domestic Bosnian legal system.111  The Ombudsperson assumed a role
similar to that of the European Commission, as initial investigator, medi-
102 BHABHA, supra note 26, at 122. R
103 Id. at 122.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 131; see CHAKRABARTY, supra note 7, at 40 (discussing Bhabha’s R
theorization of mimesis in the context of India, where “Indian history . . . remains a
mimicry of a certain ‘modern’ subject of ‘European’ history and is bound to represent
a sad figure of lack and failure”); see also ORFORD, supra note 3, at 182-84 (using R
Bhabha’s theoretical framework to discuss humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and
elsewhere).
107 See BHABHA, supra note 26, at 49-55 (using translation as a metaphor for R
imperial relationships); see also CHAKRABARTY, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing the R
“politics of translation”); FANON, supra note 54, at 38-40 (discussing the importance R
of language in colonial encounters); Hutnyk, supra note 15,  at 86 (noting ‘translation’ R
has thrived as a metaphor in social theory).
108 BHABHA, supra note 26, at 124-25 (citing T.B. Macaulay, Minute on education, R
in SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADITION:  VOLUME TWO:  MODERN INDIA AND PAKISTAN,,
vol. II at 49 (Stephen Hay ed., 2d ed., Columbia University Press 1988) (1958).
109 FANON, supra note 54, at 38. R
110 The European Commission and Court have since been merged into a single
European Human Rights Court. See Protocol No. 11, supra note 68. R
111 There was subsequently created a Bosnian Human Rights Ombudsperson,
distinct from the Human Rights Commission Ombudsperson.
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ator and advocate for the parties, and the Chamber emulated the Euro-
pean Court, as a tribunal to hear cases brought by individuals against
government representatives for human rights violations committed by
governmental actors at any level.112  Both the organization of the Secre-
tariat and, more significantly, the case processes followed the European
model, with some logistical modifications to account for domestic fac-
tors.113  As in the European Court (and most other international tribu-
nals), cases were initially screened for ‘admissibility,’ a process used to
eliminate many thousands of petitions before consideration of the merits.
After written submissions and oral arguments by the parties, cases were
then deliberated upon by the Chamber and decided on the merits.  The
significance of the procedures is in their mimicry of the European legal
framework and occupation of the domestic legal framework.
By virtue of its formation through mimesis, the work of the Chamber
retained its mark of difference.  Regardless of the intrinsic value of the
procedures, their fundamental character was purely European (and to
that extent, international and universal); the Chamber’s work in this area
was directed towards training Bosnians as “a class of interpreters” to use
and participate appropriately in these procedures, rather than adapting
the imported procedures to the Bosnian context.114  It was a one-way
translation.  The Human Rights Chamber process was grafted onto the
Bosnian legal system; it operated in parallel with the work of the Consti-
tutional Court, but it was not subject to appeal to or oversight by that
high court.  The government of Bosnia was bound to implement the deci-
sions of the Human Rights Chamber, but here too, ultimate oversight lay
not with the domestic sovereign but with the international mission – at
least for the duration of its presence.115
Translation and interpretation are useful metaphors here because they
are ubiquitous in the daily work of an international mission.  This was
also true for the Human Rights Chamber – from communication within
and among the staff and judges, to communication with petitioners and
respondent governments, to the formal deliberations and proceedings of
the court, to the published decisions of the court – language was a source
of preoccupation, frustration, possibility, politics and diplomacy.  Reflec-
tive of both European and North American involvement perhaps,
English was the dominant language – uniting judges and staff from Ice-
land, France, Italy, Turkey, Hungary, Austria, Germany, England, the
Netherlands, Finland, and the United States as the international pres-
112 Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 397; Palmer & Posa, supra note 8, at 366. R
113 1998 Chamber Report, supra note 42, at 3; 1999 Chamber Report, supra note R
42, at 1 (noting “substantial adjustments have been made to provide for the special R
composition and circumstances of the Chamber”).
114 BHABHA, supra note 26, at 124-25. R
115 1999 Chamber Report, supra note 42, at 1, 12; 1998 Chamber Report, supra R
note 42, at 8-9; Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 407. R
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ence; it also allowed some “honorary citizenship,” access to the informal
work and relationships of the Chamber, for those members of the
national staff who were fluent and excluded those who were not.116  As
for the national languages of Bosnia, they too had become politicized and
transformed by the war and its aftermath – with the language formerly
(and perhaps inaccurately) known as Serbo-Croatian now splintered into
Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian.117
More figuratively, translation was also a constant project of the inter-
national mission, reflected in the relationship between the international
and national participants, and in the work of the Human Rights Chamber
as a powerful “broker between cultural forms.”118  This translation of
Europe, the ideas and contours of human rights, was effected in the sub-
stantive decisions of the Chamber and was also present in the procedures
of the Chamber.  The (re)establishment of the ‘rule of law’ in Bosnia –
predominantly through the incorporation of European and international
human rights law to supplant domestic law, and the development of
hybrid institutions, displacing and transforming national decision-makers
– was a central objective of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the inter-
national mission in Bosnia.  Backed by both the direct force of the inter-
vention and the force of the new law set forth in the Dayton Peace
Agreement, this project succeeded in transforming the Bosnian legal
landscape.
This translation of the law of Europe – through the work of the Human
Rights Chamber and other institutions of the international mission – to
the domestic legal system was uneven, contingent, and subject to misun-
derstandings and resistance.  In its work, the unequal hybridity of the
Chamber shifted the balance of power toward international or European
dominance while simultaneously ensuring that Bosnia was always “not
quite” Europe.119  The message (and mission) of the Dayton Peace
Agreement was to render Bosnia recognizable as (though not) European;
the presence of the OHR and the Human Rights Chamber created famil-
iar institutions and imported international staff, which facilitated this rec-
ognition.  And yet, this process was always intended as a temporary,
transitional endeavour.  Now, almost fifteen years after the international
intervention, the new Bosnia continues to revisit this contested and
hybrid terrain as a part of an emerging new Europe.
116 FANON, supra note 54, at 38; see MEMMI, supra note 66, at 106-11 (discussing R
the required “linguistic dualism” of the colonized).
117 Despite this separate self-identification and the official recognition of three
languages, within the Chamber there was simply one interpretation provided in the
national language (often called just that) with the accommodation of two print
versions to reflect the two different alphabets in use (Latin and Cyrillic).
118 Hutnyk, supra note 15, at 86. R
119 BHABHA, supra note 26, at 131. R
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IV. RE-IMAGINING IDENTITIES: THE POTENTIALS OF HYBRIDITY
The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina in 1995; now almost fifteen years later, it is possible to begin to
assess the international intervention there, including its hybrid compo-
nents.  From this temporal distance, some threads of empire still weave
through the current situation in Bosnia, but others have unravelled or
faded away as Europe has begun to reconfigure itself with Bosnia, and
the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe, as constituent parts.  In
one sense, there are stories of liberation and independence within a new
Europe, and yet, there are also echoes of the imperial past of Old Europe
and the disturbing sense of a neo-imperial present of the West.  The inter-
national mission in Bosnia, and the experience of the Human Rights
Chamber, reflects these contradictory impulses and effects.  And it sug-
gests some ideas for re-thinking hybrid tribunals as a feature of such
missions.
A. Identities in a New Europe
Bosnia’s identity as ‘Europe’ versus ‘Other’ has long been both contin-
gent and contested.120  Although any map of the region placed Yugosla-
via within Europe, the notion of the Yugoslav republics existing at the
threshold of Europe, or along a border of East and West, recurred
throughout the discussions of the war in the rest of Europe and North
America.121  Discussions of Bosnia inevitably included rueful commen-
tary about the ‘internecine’ and ‘tribal’ conflicts that had been occurring
for years and the sad conclusion that modern Yugoslavia had only ever
120 Peter Fitzpatrick notes that Eastern Europe “has long occupied a wavering
position on the spectrum with what is seen, in contrast to ‘Western Europe,’ as its
more archaic, more culturally specific, more folkish, more reactive and less original
nationalism . . . . It occupies an intermediate position, European but Eastern.”
FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 128. R
121 When it had hosted the 1984 Olympics, Sarajevo was glorified as an exotic
European capital, cosmopolitan and sophisticated, secular but tolerant, with mosques,
cathedrals and temples located within blocks of one another.  As the world watched
the devastating effects of the siege of Sarajevo during the war and reacted to the
reports of concentration camps, there was collective mourning of that lost image and
a rush to explain the disconnectivity.  Orientalist notions quickly emerged and took
on significant power as Europe and the West debated the merits of involvement.  In
the West, there was a renewed interest in the Ottoman empire and its role in Bosnia,
and corresponding attempts to explain the conflict as a clash of civilizations, a battle
between Christianity and Islam, East and West. See generally EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books 1978) (discussing the long history in the West of
discursively creating and enforcing boundaries between the West and the “Orient”);
Stuart Hall, The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power in FORMATIONS OF
MODERNITY 275-320 (Stuart Hall & Bram Gieben eds., Polity Press 1992) (examining
the ways in which early colonization shaped and was shaped by discourses of West
and Other).
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been an illusion.  The purported differences between the (Eastern) Bosni-
ans and the (Western) Europeans at first served as a justification for stay-
ing out of the conflict.122  Bosnia was arguably, maybe even clearly, not
‘Europe,’ given the violent conflict, and thus the responsibility for acting
lay elsewhere.123  With the endurance and severity of the conflict, and the
growing threat to Europe proper – particularly its stability, economically
if not militarily, on the march toward unification – Bosnia began to find
its way back into Europe.  The discursive re-transformation of Bosnia
into a (contingent) part of Europe was so complete that its status as
‘Europe’ – and of the violence there as a ‘local’ phenomenon – became a
rationale identified in criticism of the willingness of the international
community to intervene there rather than in Rwanda with its more direct
echoes of colonialism.124
The international presence in Bosnia also reflected an earlier colonial
era, given the military nature of the intervention, the unequal hybrid
structure of the international mission and new domestic institutions, and
the wholesale incorporation of an external (universal) body of law.  When
intervention came to Bosnia, however, the military force was exercised by
the international community – acting through the United Nations Secur-
ity Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – rather
than a single nation.125  Similarly, after the NATO-led bombing cam-
paign, diplomatic and political pressure was exercised by the interna-
tional community, and the parties to the conflict agreed to participate in
peace negotiations in late 1995. The result of those negotiations was the
Dayton Peace Agreement and the international military and civilian mis-
sions it established to implement the peace.  With the end of the war and
the implementation of the Peace Agreement, Bosnia now had a sovereign
national government – as well as various local governments.
Nonetheless, real power within Bosnia lay with the Office of the High
Representative as the primary representative of the international com-
122 FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 128 (Cambridge University Press 2001). R
123 See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 1221 (noting the “mutually constitutive role of R
colonialism and modern Europe; many foundational constructs of modernity –
reason, man, progress, and the nation – were developed in contrast with a racialized
‘non-Europe,’ with the latter posited as pre-modern, not fully human, irrational,
outside history”); see also ORFORD, supra note 3, at 119-20 (pointing out that ‘the R
international’ . . . becomes that which major powers wish to claim or own – peace,
democracy, security, liberty – while ‘the local’ becomes that for which major powers
do not wish to take responsibility”); RAZACK, supra note 6, at 45 (discussing the R
prevalence of such attitudes in the Canadian peace-keeping mission in Somalia, but
also in other humanitarian interventions around the globe).
124 See David Theo Goldberg, Racial Europeanization, 29 ETHNIC  & RACIAL
STUD. 331, 352 (2006) (noting both the particular and the general sense of Europe “as
the place of and for Europeans historically conceived,” which “presumes Europeans
to be white and Christian”).
125 See UN Peace Agreement Report, supra note 31. R
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munity.  The OHR served a general coordinating role, both over its own
sub-parts and in connection with other aspects of the international pres-
ence.126  The external presence in Bosnia has always been a multi-
national one – international in character, even if predominantly Euro-
pean.  The civilizing mission has been a collective one – if sometimes con-
tested among its collectivity – and this collective nature of the
intervention avoids some of the more obvious overtones of imperial-
ism.127  While military security and economic interests undoubtedly
played a role in the timing and nature of the international intervention in
Bosnia, the overall mission was focused on the restoration of an indepen-
dent national state.  International involvement began with the recogni-
tion of Bosnian sovereignty, and one ultimate goal of that involvement
appears to have been the incorporation (or restoration) of Bosnia into
the European family.  Although at times the international community
may have acted as the “colonial mother  protect[ing] her child from
itself,” intervention was not intended to establish a permanent alteration
of sovereign authority or relationship of subordination – of one metropol-
itan source of power, a colonizer, and a colonial subaltern, a colonized.128
Nonetheless, the international mission is still present in Bosnia; the
Office of the High Representative still oversees the implementation of
the peace.  The OHR describes its current mandate as:
[W]orking with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and
Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course
for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. . . . [T]he OHR is
working towards transition – the point when Bosnia and Herzego-
vina is able to take full responsibility for its own affairs.129
The characterization of the OHR mission closely resembles the rhetori-
cal justifications of the earlier age of empire – caretaking as a new gov-
126 Although the OHR was a dominant presence, other international actors
included: the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”), the
Council of Europe, the European Union, the diplomatic missions of various nations
(particularly the “donor” nations funding the post-conflict rebuilding), various
international staff from development projects, non-governmental organizations,
journalists and others.
127 But see RAZACK, supra note 6, at 45 (problematizing the view that the R
“international epitomized by the United Nations becomes a space where there is no
outright aggression or colonial domination”).
128 FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 170 (Constance Farrington
trans., 1966) (1963); see generally Memmi, supra note 66 (discussing relationships of R
colonialism); see also RAZACK, supra note 6, at 157 (noting “[t]he moral universe of R
imperialism, as in the moral universe of peacekeeping mythologies, is a universe of
those who must be saved and those who must do the saving.”).
129 Office of the High Representative, OHR Introduction, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519. (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
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ernment gradually develops capability for self-government.130  Unlike in
the past, however, the transition and capability-building may have
occurred to some extent, and it appears that the external presence will
finally depart without need for revolution or an overt independence cam-
paign.131  Over the years, the responsibilities of the OHR have gradually
contracted, and more responsibility has devolved to the national govern-
ment, although the OHR maintains ultimate authority in many respects.
The OHR was slated to end its tenure in 2008 but at present still remains
in Bosnia with the expectation of increased involvement by the European
Union as Bosnia advances on the path to accession and membership in
that “epitome[ ] of the universal and progressive.”132
While traces of imperial relationships are still suggested in the OHR
presence and other ongoing international involvement, the relationships
have been somewhat transformed from the early days of the international
mission.  Bosnia and Herzegovina acceded to the Council of Europe in
2002, which was acclaimed as an important step towards full membership
in ‘Europe.’133  It has not yet become a member state of the European
Union although the early stages of that process have also begun.  In a
2003 report of the European Commission, the executive body of the
European Union, regarding Bosnia’s preparedness for negotiations on
accession, the ‘progress’ enabled by the international intervention is
presented as Bosnian progress.  In a section entitled “Democracy and the
Rule of Law,” the Commission affirms:
The constitution of [Bosnia] specifies (article I.2) that [Bosnia] is a
democratic state operating under the rule of law with free and demo-
cratic elections.  The constitution incorporates the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.  Democratic systems have begun to
function. . . . The rule of law has been gradually re-established: the
country is generally peaceful; there is freedom of expression and
peaceful assembly.  Freedom of movement is guaranteed and the
130 See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 141-42 (discussing the problem of finding “a legal R
category to capture the nature of the international personality” of territories such as
Kosovo and East Timor “given that all the existing categories that intuitively seem to
fit – protectorate, trust territory – must be dismissed because of their links to
colonialism”).
131 See generally FANON, supra note 128 (discussing violence in independence R
struggles); MEMMI, supra note 66 (discussing revolt as a response to colonialism). R
132 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 136-37 (discussing the role of the European R
Union in modern Europe where “the EU and its law are formed and exalted as
epitomes of the universal and progressive”).
133 See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 422 (noting implementation of R
Chamber decisions was a condition for membership).
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right to property has in most cases been enforced.  Given recent his-
tory, these and other rights are no small achievement.134
Striking a similar tone, the section on “Human Rights” notes: “For-
mally, [Bosnian] citizens enjoy all the human rights and freedoms identi-
fied in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols.  According to the [Bosnia] con-
stitution (Art. II.2), these apply directly in [Bosnia] and have priority
over all other law.”135  Although many areas for continued Bosnian
‘improvement’ are identified in the report, the satisfaction (and perhaps
even self-congratulation) at the successful, though still somewhat menac-
ing, mimicry of the West by the Bosnian institutions is transparent.
More recent reports have been less optimistic.  For example, the 2007
“Progress Report” on Bosnia suggests less progress on establishing the
rule of law; it summarizes:
On the basis of the Dayton/Paris Agreement, the international com-
munity continues to maintain a significant presence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  The Office of the High Representative and the EU
Special Representative have been working closely with the Euro-
pean Commission on issues related to European integration. How-
ever, the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not
demonstrated the capacity to take further political ownership and
responsibility over reform.  Due to the tense political situation and
the lack of reform, the High Representative has continued to play an
important role in facilitating reform and governance issues. Between
1 January and 30 September 2007, the High Representative used his
executive powers on 31 occasions, which included the imposition of
legislation and the removal of officials.136
The 2008 Progress Report is virtually identical except that it notes that
the “High Representative’s use of his executive powers has remained low,
and he has not enacted any new legislation in the reporting period.”137
Regarding human rights, the more recent reports state:
134 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the
Council on the Preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Negotiate a Stabilisation
and Association Agreement with the European Union, at 6, (Nov. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter Commission Report], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0692:FIN:EN:PDF.
135 Id. at 12.
136 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working
Document, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Progress Report, at 8, (Nov. 6, 2007)
[hereinafter European Commission Working Document], available at http://www.
europa.ba/files/docs/publications/en/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_2007_Progress_
Report.pdf.
137 Id. at 7; Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2008) 674 final (Nov.
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Overall, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited progress in
improving the observance of international human rights law.  It has
achieved results in addressing the backlog of human rights-related
cases, but there is room for improvement as regards the implementa-
tion of rulings.  Implementation of international human rights con-
ventions also needs to improve.138
Thus, over the years since the Dayton Peace Agreement, the transition
from protectorate, even subaltern, to full sovereign, has been slow-mov-
ing and it remains incomplete.  From the perspective of the West, while
Bosnia does not yet act as an equal, it is also not considered a colony – it
is a “probationary member of the West” that may gradually be permitted
to move out of “the waiting room of history.”139
B. Rethinking Hybrid Courts
The experience of the mission in Bosnia suggests ways for reconsider-
ing hybrid courts as a form of international intervention.  In keeping with
the temporary nature of the international mission, the Human Rights
Chamber was always conceived as a transitional measure.  Under the
Peace Agreement, its original mandate was intended to cease in 2000 at
the end of a five-year transitional period.140  Accordingly, discussions
started in early 1999 on the process for winding down the work of the
Chamber and merging it into the national court system.  At that time, the
predominant participants in the process and the decision-makers were
international, rather than national.141  The OHR requested that the Euro-
pean Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice
Commission, begin consideration on the future of the Human Rights
5, 2008) [hereinafter Commission Communication], available at http://www.europa.ba/
docs/progress2.pdf.
138 Commission Report, supra note 134, at 16.  The 2008 Report contains nearly R
identical language.  European Commission Working Document, supra note 136, at 16
(“Overall, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited additional progress on
improving observance of international human rights law. Implementation of
international human rights conventions needs to improve. Efforts to ensure proper
enforcement of human rights need to increase.”).
139 FITZPATRICK, supra note 4, at 117-18 (noting “Eastern Europe has recently
emerged as an intermediate category [between civilized society and barbarism] and as
a probationary member of the West, expected to progress rapidly towards full
conformity with ‘the rule of law’; MEHTA, supra note 51, at 97 (suggesting that a more R
ethical possibility “does not require being confined in the waiting room of history
while some other agency has the key to that room”); see also CHAKRABARTY, supra
note 7, at 8 (discussing the historicist argument that consigns “Indians, Africans, and R
other ‘rude’ nations to an imaginary waiting room of history”).
140 Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 33, art. XIV. R
141 Yeager, supra note 8, at 51-53 (discussing the end of the Chamber’s mandate). R
\\server05\productn\B\BIN\28-1\BIN101.txt unknown Seq: 33 11-FEB-10 13:17
2010] HYBRID COURTS 33
Chamber.142  The Venice Commission, an advisory arm of the Council of
Europe, is a European body that describes itself as follows:
[T]he commission has played a leading role in the adoption of consti-
tutions that conform to the standards of Europe’s constitutional heri-
tage.  . . .
It contributes to the dissemination of the European constitutional
heritage, based on the continent’s fundamental legal values while
continuing to provide “constitutional first-aid” to individual
states. . . .
. . . .
The work of the European Commission for Democracy through
Law aims at upholding the three underlying principles of Europe’s
constitutional heritage: democracy, human rights and the rule of law
- the cornerstones of the Council of Europe.143
While the Bosnian government was involved as a participant in the dis-
cussions of its constitutional future, the Venice Commission made the rec-
ommendations as the voice of “European constitutional heritage.”144
The ultimate conclusion of that process was a new agreement adopted in
September 2003 between the Bosnian state and its constituent entities
providing for the merger of the Human Rights Chamber into the Bosnian
Constitutional Court.  The former hybrid tribunal of the Human Rights
Chamber now exists as a solely national Human Rights Commission
within the Bosnian Constitutional Court.145  The Constitutional Court
142 Additional information on the work of the Venice Commission is available at
the Commission’s website at http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/presentation_E.asp?
MenuL=E.
143 Council of Europe, The Venice Commission, http://www.venice.coe.int/site/
main/Presentation_E.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
144 Id.; see Mahmud, supra note 11, at 1221 (noting that the civilizing ambitions of R
Europe aspire to “a process whereby the geographically distant Other is supposed to,
in time, become like oneself; Europe’s present becomes all Others’ future”); Hall,
supra note 121, at 314 (suggesting “[w]ithout the Rest (or its own internal ‘others’), R
the West would not have been able to recognize and represent itself as the summit of
human history”).
145 The five original members of the Commission were all former Chamber judges,
including two international judges and three national judges.  Human Rights
Commission Within the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://
www.hrc.ba/commission/eng/default.htm. (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).  All members of
the Commission were appointed by the President of the Constitutional Court, a
Bosnian judge. The Human Rights Chamber officially ceased its existence at the end
of 2003, and the Human Rights Commission began its work in 2004 with the mandate
to complete by the end of 2004 the cases that were pending before the Chamber. Id.
Under the new agreement, Bosnian authorities were charged with “mak[ing] possible
the evolution of the current transition system into a sustainable system of protection
of [ ] human rights.” Id.  At the end of 2004, with thousands of cases still pending, the
Commission was transformed once again into a solely Bosnian institution within the
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continues the Chamber’s work in a more traditional form – with the lin-
gering presence of the international mission in the remaining cases and
precedent of the Chamber and in the continued role of international
judges on the Constitutional Court itself.  The human rights commitments
of Bosnia – as defined by the European Convention and the other inter-
national agreements identified in and incorporated by the Constitution –
also remain as a marker of the boundaries of Europe.
It is difficult to pierce the discursive hegemony of the West – particu-
larly reflected in the official reports of the European and international
bodies charged with assessing Bosnian progress – to determine Bosnian
views on the international intervention.146  The international presence
has now shrunk, and the hybrid institutions have now become more fully
national.  It is possible that the originally constructed hybridity may be
more organic now through that “imperceptible process whereby two or
more cultures merge into a new mode.”147  For better or worse (depend-
ing on one’s perspective), the post-war, post-Dayton institutions exist
now as a product of both Bosnian and international involvement; they
continue as Bosnian institutions, transformed by the shared experiences
of the intervention and the daily accretion of new identities.
As useful as post-colonial and other critical social theory is to explain
the international mission in Bosnia, and more broadly, to raise questions
about the new fascination with hybrid tribunals, the experiences in Bos-
nia may also reshape understandings of post-colonialism, neo-colonialism
and the complex power relations at play.  Bosnia has challenged the self-
definitions of Europe and the West, and it continues to do so.  A new
form of civilizing mission and an attempt to affirm the rule of a universal
international and European law may have motivated and structured the
international mission, but in this new context, more autonomy was given
to the national authorities, both initially and ultimately.  Perhaps as a
result, there are indications that there has been some success in “provin-
cializing” Europe: discourse invokes Old Europe and New Europe now,
in addition to and at times destabilizing the earlier (and differently prob-
lematic) tropes of Western Europe and Eastern Europe.148  Questions
about the role of empire in international interventions remain, but they
offer opportunities for productive engagement – they should be renewed,
re-examined, revised as the next steps in the international mission in Bos-
Constitutional Court.  Human Rights Commission within the Constitutional Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.hrc.ba/commission/eng/default.htm. (last visited
Oct. 1, 2009).
146 See SAID, supra note 121, at 49 (describing the West’s long history of shaping
discourse regarding the East); Hall, supra note 121, at 318 (noting “the discourse of R
‘the West and the Rest’ is alive and well in the modern world”).
147 YOUNG, supra note 11, at 21. R
148 See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 7 (seeking to displace imaginary and hyper-real R
conceptions of Europe which conflate political modernity with Europe).
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nia are undertaken, each time another international intervention is
imagined, and whenever new hybrid tribunals and other mechanisms of
transitional justice are considered.149
The intent of the critique in this article is to provide a foundation for
challenging static and simplistic ideas of hybridity, particularly in the con-
text of hybrid tribunals, and to encourage a deeper consideration of the
opportunities and limitations of hybrid institutions.  As other scholars
have noted, hybrid tribunals offer real potential as a means to facilitate
recovery in a post-conflict or transitional situation.150  As the experiences
in Bosnia and elsewhere illustrate, hybrid tribunals also risk reinscribing
problematic power relations from the micro level of interpersonal rela-
tionships and case work to the macro level of geo-political relationships.
In order to advance the discussion about the potential and future use of
hybrid tribunals, the following issues at a minimum should be interro-
gated more thoroughly: the notion of hybridity based on an international-
national dichotomy; the power relations within hybrid institutions and
their work; and the complexities of transplanting or importing law, partic-
ularly in a post-conflict environment.  Although these themes have been
elaborated throughout, they are briefly reiterated here:
The international-national dichotomy.  This distinction is pervasive in
international law, and in the human rights field, but it is seldom
problematized.151  Of course, for individuals, such status is situational
rather than immutable.  A Bosnian in Bosnia is national (or even local),
but a Bosnian in East Timor is international.  Nonetheless, like all dual-
isms this one is too often an unequal and oppositional one, with power
and status located primarily in the international.  Hybrid institutions that
incorporate these distinctions risk solidifying them, as well as over-valo-
rizing the international and under-valorizing the national.  Although it is
common to bemoan political influences and conflicts of interests by
national participants, little or no attention is given to the same possibili-
ties among international participants.152  The international becomes
149 See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 10, at 391 (arguing that “the Human Rights R
Chamber has set an important precedent for future international interventions”);
Yeager, supra note 8, at 53 (suggesting the Chamber provides an example to follow in R
future interventions); Dickinson, supra note 1, at 39-42 (discussing the possibility of a R
hybrid tribunal in Afghanistan).
150 See generally  Dickinson, supra note 2; Dickinson, supra note 1, at 33-37 R
(discussing issues of legitimacy and capacity); Higoneet, supra note 2 (stressing the R
importance of including a local component for legitimacy, accessibility and capacity-
building); Megret, supra note 13 (urging hybridity in war crimes prosecutions because R
it collapses artificial distinctions between domestic and international).
151 See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 204 (discussing how the international community R
constitutes itself in opposition to a chaotic local).
152 See, e.g., Higonnet, supra note 2 (discussing problems of corruption and R
political influence in local courts and in local participation in hybrid courts); Cohen,
supra note 1 (discussing problems of local participation in tribunals in East Timor, R
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stripped of personal and national affiliations, neutralized as expert, while
the national is overly personalized and nationalized.  Moreover, this over-
simplification is also writ large.  The international community as a whole
is often absolved from any complicity or misconduct in the intervention
or in the conditions that may have fostered or exacerbated the conflict;
the locus for responsibility remains solely with the national.153  Further
thought should be given to the consequences of this international-
national distinction and to ways to destabilize it.  In crafting future hybrid
tribunals, it may be time to consider other or multiple hybridities that are
based on differing expertise or competencies or that splinter the ‘interna-
tional’ into greater particularity.
Power relations.  There is very little empirical data available about the
everyday practices of hybrid tribunal structures, or even about the effec-
tiveness of such institutions.154  Based on the tribunals that have been
created to date, however, it is clear that there are often distinctions
between personnel from the host country and from outside.  These may
be based on the national-international dichotomy or upon outdated
notions of working in the ‘field.’  These distinctions may profoundly
structure the relationships and work of hybrid institutions.  They may also
have meaning and material consequences for the capabilities of the insti-
tutions and for their longer term credibility, both of which have been
identified as important objectives for hybrid tribunals.155  Further
research should be done in this area with the goal of enriching the
existing assessments of tribunal work and of minimizing problematic hier-
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia); Sriram, supra note 2 (discussing corruption and related R
problems in the local courts in Sierra Leone).
153 See generally ORFORD, supra note 3 (problematizing humanitarian R
interventions in East Timor, Bosnia, Rwanda and elsewhere); RAZACK, supra note 6 R
(examining the role of Canada and other Western nations in interventions in Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda and elsewhere); PATRICIA MARCHAK, NO EASY FIX: GLOBAL
RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WARS AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (McGill-Queen’s
University Press 2008) (discussing humanitarian interventions in Cambodia, Bosnia
and Rwanda).
154 For an example of this type of research in a different context, examining
attitudes of Bosnian judges and prosecutors towards the International Criminal
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, see Hum. Rts. Ctr., Int’l Hum. Rts. L. Clinic, Univ. of
California, Berkeley et al., Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction:  An
Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors (2000), available at http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/JUDICIAL_REPORT_ENGLISH.pdf; see also Richard
Ashby Wilson, Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and
Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN
THE GLOBAL AND LOCAL 342, 366 (Mark Goodale & Sally E. Merry eds., Cambridge
University Press 2007) (calling for researchers to “venture into the sites of production
of international human rights laws and norms and to gain access to international
criminal tribunals and examine their knowledge construction practices”).
155 See Dickinson, supra note 2, at 296. R
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archies.  Possible areas of inquiry include examination of differences in
compensation and professional development opportunities, in status
within and outside of the institution, in day-to-day institutional practices
and procedures, and in the forms of expertise brought to the tribunal
(including competencies in language, in domestic and international law,
in local and regional history, and so forth).
Transplanting or importing law.  Too often, human rights advocates and
policymakers endorse the wholesale importation of international human
rights law into a domestic context.  This elides the important role of
national authorities and their citizens in making domestic law, and it
often undermines the credibility of the new legal regime.  This can, of
course, be counter-productive in numerous ways: it appears (and may be)
undemocratic, it may consequently lack validity and legitimacy, and it
ignores the valid critiques that have emerged about existing human rights
law.156  It also ignores both the long imperial history of taking such mea-
sures as well as the complexities of domestic systems which may have
functioned successfully, if differently, in important respects.  At a mini-
mum, the international community should resist the temptation to
require more from national authorities emerging from a conflict situation
than they could reasonably expect in their own national contexts.157
Increasing legal protection for human rights is still a worthy goal, but
greater care should be taken in how that goal is achieved.  In the case of
hybrid tribunals, personnel should have knowledge of, if not expertise in,
both the relevant domestic and international law.  Given the potential
power imbalances, it is insufficient to assume that domestic participants
alone will provide the domestic expertise and that foreign participants
alone will provide the international expertise.  To the extent there is
capacity building in this area, it should flow in both (or multiple)
directions.
This list of issues is not meant to be exhaustive in identifying important
facets of hybridity for further investigation, rather it is meant to be pro-
ductive, even provocative, of deeper inquiry.  These issues of power are
central issues that are too often ignored in international interventions and
in the creation and work of hybrid tribunals.  Social theory, particularly
post-colonial theory and critical globalization studies,  has much to offer
156 See, e.g., An-Na’im, supra note 83, at 348-53 (discussing the exclusion of non- R
western participants and perspectives in the early development of the international
human rights regime); CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 83 at 36-37 R
(identifying a “Southern” critique of the “Western origins, orientation and cultural
bias” of the international legal order), 174-79 (noting “[b]oth the U.N.’s membership
and its bureaucracy are dominated by men”).
157 See generally Elizabeth Bruch, Whose Law Is It Anyway? The Cultural
Legitimacy of International Human Rights in the United States, 73 TENN. L. REV. 669
(2006) (critiquing U.S. reluctance to adopt international human rights standards).
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to enhance the pragmatist approach often deployed in international inter-
ventions.  It is time to turn a more critical lens on such projects.
V. CONCLUSION
Hybrid tribunals have been hailed for their potential in post-conflict
and other transitional situations.  They seem to offer a ‘best of both
worlds’ approach by bringing together national and international compo-
nents in a productive new form.  They are increasingly being established
in various contexts around the globe and appear frequently in conjunc-
tion with broader international intervention.  In the human rights litera-
ture and in practice, the optimism surrounding such tribunals has seldom
been tempered by a serious consideration of what it means to operate as
a hybrid institution, and as a result, neither the opportunities nor the limi-
tations of such an approach have been fully explored.  Post-colonial and
critical globalization scholars have, however, been more active in consid-
ering both old and new forms of hybridity.  Their insights have much to
offer to advance the dialogue on hybrid tribunals and on the larger con-
text of international interventions.
The international intervention and on-going presence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina presents an illuminating case study.  In many respects it
appears as a neo-colonial undertaking by Europe and the West or a pro-
totype of a new imperialism; subsequent interventions in Kosovo and
East Timor have adopted similar practices and structures.  It disrupted
Bosnian sovereignty, after recognizing it as such, and embarked on a
long-term mission of stabilizing and civilizing the post-conflict society.
More than traditional colonial endeavours, it attempted to match its
actions to its rhetoric of progress, capacity-building and independence.
The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a hybrid
human rights tribunal created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, provides
particular insight into this modern articulation of empire, if it is imperial-
ism at all, grounded not so much in national ambitions as in international
community aspirations.  It also foreshadowed the growing use of hybrid
tribunals elsewhere, in places as diverse as Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
As the international community imagines and experiments with new
forms of intervention (and there appears to be no real end to this experi-
mentation in sight), it must also acknowledge and engage with the many
complexities of hybridity.
